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Most pre-crisis explanations of the various corporate governance systems have considered the 
separation between ownership and control to be an advantage of the Anglo-American 
economies. They have also attributed the failure of other countries to achieve these efficient 
arrangements to their different legal and/or electoral systems. In this paper we compare this 
view with the co-evolution approach based on the hypothesis that politics and corporate 
governance influence each other, generating complex interactions of financial and labour 
market institutions. Countries cluster along different complementary politics-business 
interaction paths and there is no reason to expect, or to device policies for, their convergence 
to a single model of corporate governance. We argue that this hypothesis provides a more 
convincing explanation of the past histories of major capitalist economies and can suggest 
some useful possible scenarios of their future institutional development. Bayesian model 
comparison suggests that the co-evolution approach turns out at least as influential as the 
competing theories in explaining shareholder and worker protection determination. 
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1. Introduction 
The current crisis has marked a new end of the end of history in corporate governance
1. Before, the 
crisis, like the earlier successes achieved by Japan and Germany, the recent success of the American 
economy and the revival of the British economy had attracted the attention of many economists and 
policy makers. The legal origins approach (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999) claimed that the Anglo-
American success was rooted in the different common law and civil law traditions characterizing these 
countries well before the advent of capitalism. In common law systems, private owners, including the 
minority shareholders of contemporary large firms, could be better protected. Another approach 
(Pagano and Volpin, 2005) had emphasized that the non-proportional electoral systems, prevalent in 
the Anglo-American countries, favored shareholders-friendly political coalitions. Legal and electoral 
reforms were advocated to change what was once upon a time an American exception into the general 
rule to be followed by all countries.   
“American exceptionalism” has long been a puzzle for social scientists. However, the nature of 
the problem has somewhat changed over time. Becht and De Long (2005) have observed that a 
century ago academics like Werner Sombart were intrigued by the exceptional nature of the United 
States in that it did not have socialism, while today academics are concerned about a different form of 
American exceptionalism: the negligible role of block holding in the United States. 
Mark Roe (2003)’s contribution suggests an interesting link between the past “non-socialism” 
and the recent “non-block-holding” American puzzles: a tradition of very weak social democracy 
could explain the negligible role of block holding.  According to Roe (2003), the higher the degree of 
social democracy (and, in particular, the strength of employees’ rights), the stronger the tendency of 
employers to organize themselves into concentrated forms of corporate ownership with one or few 
major block holders. Figure 1 plots the residuals obtained from the regression of the labour protection 
index and of the ownership concentration index over log per capita GDP for 47 countries.
2 As is 
apparent from the fitted regression line, there is a significant positive cross-country correlation 
between the degree of protection of workers’ rights and the degree of corporate ownership 
concentration, even once the cross-country differences in per capita GDP have been considered. 
According to this figure, American exceptionalism is an extreme case of a general relation linking 
employee job protection with the degree of separation between ownership and control. In order to 
explain the positive relation between protection of workers’ rights and corporate ownership 
concentration, Roe (2003) suggests that there is a causality  
                                                 
1 Hansmann and Kraakman (2004) have even described convergence to the Anglo-American model as the “end of history of 
corporate governance”. Other authors (see, for instance, Morck et al., 2005, and James, 2006) have argued that a variety of 
arrangements exist in modern capitalist economies, and that family groups are the prevailing form of organization in some 
countries. Bebchuk and Roe (2004) have emphasized the path-dependent nature of corporate governance. 
2 The data source for the labour protection index (which includes protection of labour and employment laws plus protection 
of collective relations laws) is Botero et al. (2004); GDP per capita in 2000 is from World Bank (2004); the ownership 
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Figure 1. Partial regression plot of labour protection index and ownership concentration (independent variable 
is per capita log GDP). Coef. =  0.5916 (p-value = 0.006). 
 
relation running from employees’ political rights to corporate governance forms.
3 One form of 
American exceptionalism (no socialism) has influenced the other (little block holding). 
Belloc and Pagano (2005, 2009) have argued that the relationship is more complex because the 
causation operates in two opposite directions. Forms of corporate governance, such as the degree of 
separation between ownership and control, influence the strength of workers’ organization. When 
there is no separation between ownership and control, employees are more likely to seek protection 
against interference by the dominant block holders and their social circle, including their relatives and 
friends, who may otherwise monopolize the best jobs in the company. Thus, while employees’ rights 
may prevent the separation between ownership and control, conversely the existence of powerful 
block holders may favour some sort of “social democratic reaction” and, in particular, a high degree of 
union activity. This two-way relationship entails multiple co-evolution paths between ownership 
concentration and workers’ organization: a certain degree of centralization of one side’s interests may 
                                                 
3 Roe (2003) presents evidence that countries characterized by stronger job protection and employees’ political rights 
(stronger “social democracy”) tend to have more concentrated corporate ownership forms. The causality relation is, however, 
not tested by the author. In similar vein, Mueller and Philippon (2007) argue that (family) concentrated ownership is 
relatively more common in countries where labour relations are hostile, while dispersed ownership is prevalent in countries 
characterized by cooperative labour relations. They also offer coherent empirical evidence using survey-based measures of 
the quality of labour relations and ownership structures data for 30 countries.  
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easily induce a corresponding concentration of the other side’s interests (this view will be referred to 
hereafter as the co-evolution approach). As in an arms race, the interactions between business and 
politics can produce different degrees of organization in the owners’ and workers’ interests (Belloc 
and Pagano, 2009). In similar vein, Gelter (2009) argues that, seeking to re-balance the power of the 
weaker part, legislations lead to multiple configurations of the economy. Typically they couple weak 
shareholder with weak stakeholder legal rights and strong shareholder with strong stakeholder rights. 
Also in this perspective, there is no evident criterion to rank these two local optima.
4 
Unlike the co-evolution approach, the other two approaches (the legal origins and the electoral 
systems approaches) make a ranking among the different systems of corporate governance, suggesting 
consequent measures for public policies. In one case the separation between ownership and control 
and the determination of employment protection are explained on the basis of “better” corporate laws 
which stem from different legal origins; in the other non-proportional electoral systems, prevailing in 
the Anglo-American world, provide better protection for minority shareholders. The latter two routes, 
which are sharply different from the co-evolution approach, have been taken by a great deal of the 
recent literature.  
The legal origin approach of La Porta et al. (1999, 2006) offer overwhelming evidence that legal 
traditions help explain cross-country variations in ownership concentration: widely-held firms are 
more common in countries characterized by a high degree of shareholder protection, while family-
controlled and state-controlled firms are more numerous in the economies where shareholder 
protection is weaker. Moreover, the first subsample is dominated by British law economies, and the 
second one by French law countries. According to the empirical investigation on the regulation of the 
labour markets conducted by Botero et al. (2004), not only common law economies tend to regulate 
the least, while civil law countries the most,
5 but the legal origins theory turns out to explain national 
labour protection laws better than the political power and efficiency theories. The electoral systems 
approach of Pagano and Volpin (2005) considers the political simultaneous determinants of 
shareholder and employment protection. Their findings suggest that the proportionality of the voting 
system exerts negative effects on the degree of shareholder protection, while has a positive impact on 
the strictness of the workers’ rights legislation. Their results also corroborate the important role played 
by the legal origins in the determination of the two variables. Given the support that the legal origins 
and electoral systems approaches have found in previous studies, in the second part of this paper we 
will assess the empirical validity of the co-evolution approach relative to these existing theories. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we produce theoretical 
and historical arguments in support of the co-evolution approach (Roe, 2003; Belloc and Pagano, 
                                                 
4 Moreover, according to Ecchia, Gelter and Pasotti (2009), the legal protections of minority shareholders and employees 
influence each other and tend to produce a complex variety of institutional arrangements. 
5  With a different focus but espousing the same theoretical approach, Djankov et al. (2003) show that the degree of 
procedural formalism of dispute resolution is systematically lower in common than in civil law countries.  
  4
2005; 2009; Gelter, 2009; Ecchia, Gelter, and Pasotti 2009). In particular we maintain that the paths of 
United Kingdom and Switzerland can be explained by the co-evolution approach while they are 
difficult to conciliate with the legal and electoral systems explanations. In section 3 we report 
Bayesian estimations and Bayesian model comparison among the various theories of labour protection 
and ownership concentration determination. We show that the co-evolution approach is preferred in 
terms of likelihood maximization to the competing approaches. Finally, in the last section, we 
conclude by briefly considering post-crisis scenarios and some preliminary policy implications of our 
analysis.   
 
2. Competing theories and alternative historical paths 
In his book Strong Managers, Weak Owners, Mark Roe (1994, p. 4) observed how, in spite of all the 
shortcomings today in the spotlight, the separation of ownership and control has allowed skilled 
managers to run firms and has prevented unskilled descendants from gaining control of firms they 
would be unable to run well. In similar vein, Chandler (1990) contrasted American and German 
managerial firms with British family firms at the time of the second industrial revolution, arguing that 
family control was the cause of England’s poor performance.   
Managerial hierarchies do not simply entail the usual problem that the interests of the managers 
must be made consistent with those of the shareholders; they also entail the broader, and somehow 
opposite, problem that the “family allocation of control” must not interfere with the firm’s internal 
meritocracy and the incentives for good managerial performance.  In spite of the well-known agency 
problems, the separation between ownership and control has had positive effects because it increases 
the role of competence allocation rules with respect to family connection ones.   
The US was ideally suited to developing the meritocratic institutions necessary for the working of 
managerial hierarchies. It lacked the class divisions that had given rise to the dynastic assignment of 
many jobs in Europe. The weakness of American “social democracy” was related to the widespread 
feeling that membership of a lower class was not an insurmountable barrier against the achievement of 
economic power, and consequently that there was no imperative need to organize unions and other 
institutions which could tame the economic power of established capitalist dynasties.  
The US was typically characterised by politicians who acted on the belief that a full-blown 
democracy (as well as their own “democratic power”) was incompatible with the concentration of 
economic power. In this respect, a single cultural and political tradition comprised Jefferson's vision of 
a democracy based on small land owners, Jackson's clash with the power of the Bank of America, and 
Lincoln's successful war against the slave owning aristocracy of the South (Hofstadter, 1967). At the 
beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century the US was the only country (perhaps besides  
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Switzerland
6) where the landed aristocracy had no important cultural and political role in social life. 
Because of its anti-aristocratic attitude, the US reacted early to the concentration of economic power 
which came with the second industrial revolution. The Sherman Act (1890) was the first, and by far 
the most important, piece of anti-monopoly legislation to be enacted in a modern economy. After 
Theodore Roosevelt's clashes with big business, Wilson continued the endeavour to set limits on the 
power of the major block holders. The Clayton Act (1914) ruled that the ownership of substantial 
stakes in different firms might induce self-dealing and unfair competition and should therefore be 
supervised by anti-trust authorities. F.D. Roosevelt completed these policies by using taxation to 
dismantle the pyramids (Randall, 2004) that, in many cases, had enabled a few “economic royalists” to 
use “other people’s money” to impose a “new industrial dictatorship” (Roosevelt quoted by Roe, 1994, 
p. 40).  
While the American absence of social-democratic job protection allowed the radical 
diversification of asset ownership and the transfer of power from owners to managers, also the reverse 
was happening: social democratic job protection became weaker because early restrictions were 
imposed on block holders so that it was more difficult to gain private benefits from partial, but 
substantial, ownership. Early democratic policies induced dispersed forms of ownership and a 
separation between ownership and control. This “exceptional” early dispersion of capitalist interests 
made it less important for workers to concentrate their interests in strong unions and in social 
democratic parties. The two sides of American “exceptionalism” reinforced each other: there was little 
socialism because block holding was inhibited; and there was little block holding because a socialist 
movement of European magnitude and radicalism did not develop. 
The two-way causation between politics and business is also evident in those countries where 
there were marked class barriers, and where dynastic policies played an explicit role in both the 
political and economic sphere. This typology included England, where the landed aristocracy had 
transformed itself into an entrepreneurial class and led a revolution against the powers of the crown. It 
also comprised cases, such as France, where the aristocracy had resisted revolutionary forces with 
varying degrees of success or, even more problematic ones like Germany, where the emerging 
                                                 
6 There are remarkable similarities between the historical backgrounds of the US and Switzerland. Both countries are 
somehow geographically protected by foreign powers, respectively by oceans and mountains, and internally geographically 
divided by long distances (the US) and by the high altitudes of the Alps (Switzerland) - a geography that has favoured 
decentralized federalist arrangements in the two countries. Both countries came early to tolerance of religious and ethnic 
diversity and the “cement of society” was more shared values and lifestyles than ethnic or religious homogeneity. 
Switzerland too achieved early liberation from feudal relations. Swiss feudal ties were traditionally weak: the peasants were 
difficult to dominate because they were often far from urban centres on Alpine pastures, and because they had good military 
training (they often serving as highly sought-after mercenaries throughout Europe). After the defeat of the Sonderbund 
alliance, formed in 1847 by the conservative and Catholic Cantons, the “Swiss Confederation or, more accurately, some 
twenty-three leading figures in it, drafted a document so suited to the conditions that the Switzerland of 1849 and of 1847 
seem to belong to different eras” (Steinberg, 1996, p. 47).  Similarly to the US (where the war of secession terminated the 
political influence of the slave-owning landed aristocracy of the South) Swiss big business had “democratic origins” in the 
sense that a full blown post-feudal society had already emerged before the second industrial revolution.  
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bourgeoisie could acquire legitimacy only by imitating the customs and the dynastic ambitions of the 
Junkers (see Moore, 1973). In these economies, the power of family dynasties upset the values of 
managerial meritocracy (Morck, 2005 and 2006).  Wealth, family connections, the proper accent, 
social skills and even appropriate table manners interfered with the allocation of jobs based on effort 
and competence. In these circumstances, social-democratic movements readily emerged as 
spontaneous reactions against the privileges of the ruling dynasties and were reinforced by the 
widespread feeling that the “have-nots” had to be defended against the exercise, and often the abuse, 
of economic power. Faced with the concentration of the power of the wealthy, “social democracy” 
could only limit and, sometimes, challenge its exercise by organizing a countervailing power. Whilst 
“social democracy” could scare owners and prevent the separation of ownership and control, the 
combination of ownership and control created the conditions for various types of “social-democratic” 
reaction, including unionization and the development of job protection. 
Dispersed ownership and a low degree of “social democracy” can be seen as institutional 
complements to each other, and so too can concentrated ownership and a high degree of “social 
democracy”. One explanation for these complementarity relations can be couched in terms of 
reciprocal disarmament and armament. Each group can achieve a greater capacity to exercise power 
by concentrating dispersed interests in centralized agents which are better able to solve free-riding 
problems (Olson, 1965). As in an arms race game, all levels of armaments may be in equilibrium and 
define different countervailing balances of power (see Belloc and Pagano, 2009). For instance, the 
balance of power can remain the same if both owners and workers are dispersed or if both are 
concentrated. Thus defined are two extreme equilibria, which approximate the US and the countries 
clustered at the bottom-left corners of Figure 1. The self-reinforcing interactions between dispersed 
ownership and labour interests generate a dispersed equilibrium; similarly, the self-reinforcing 
interactions between concentrated ownership and centrally organized workers’ interests generate a 
concentrated equilibrium.  
In both the extreme and intermediate cases, the incentive for one side to concentrate its interests 
increases with the growing concentration of the other side’s interests. In other words, the 
(dis)armament of one party favours the dis(armament) of the other. However, there are limits to this 
symmetric representation of the concentration and dispersion of owners’ and workers’ interests. 
Ordinary market transactions may concentrate the ownership of capital into the hands of a few owners, 
and there will be a spontaneous tendency for this to happen whenever it increases profits. By contrast, 
because of non-slavery and self-ownership, the ownership of labour is necessarily dispersed and the 
concentration of labour cannot be achieved by means of standard economic contracts. In this case, 
politics can be used to stop the concentration of capital or to enhance the concentration of labour 
interests in trade unions.  
Since market forces tend to concentrate capital much more easily than labour, in the absence of 
an early and strong policy, a concentrated equilibrium is likely to arise: the “political” organization  
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and concentration of workers’ interests follows the spontaneous “economic” concentration of capitalist 
ownership. When political measures are anticipated by spontaneous capitalist concentration, they react 
to the latter by favouring a comparable concentration of interests on the workers’ side. Some degree of 
social democracy or other arrangements restoring the balance of power between the two parties are 
thus likely to arise in a democratic society.  
The historical conditions under which a dispersed equilibrium is likely to come about are rather 
special, and they have perhaps been approximated only by the US.
 When the need for large scale 
companies arose, no other country (with the possible exception of Switzerland) had so many citizens 
who had massively, and sometimes consciously, exited from dynastic feudal relations. Many of them 
had done so in search of religious freedom. Moreover, by revolting against British colonial rule, their 
ancestors had also broken with deference to established family dynasties. Only in America did such a 
strong ideology against “economic royalists” and “industrial dictatorship” (Roosevelt quoted by Roe, 
1994, p. 40) exist before the age of large scale capitalist firms. A key component of this ideology was 
distaste for the type of concentrated dynastic interests characterising the old continent. Social respect 
moved from people born wealthy to “self-made” individuals. Thus, the meritocratic ascent of a 
corporate managerial ladder was far more compatible with American ideology than deferential respect 
for the concentrated power of the capitalist dynasties. Managers did not have to plot against 
concentrated owners: they were the unintended beneficiaries of a political struggle against 
concentrated interests (Roe, 1994). The public company run by managers was the unintended outcome 
of this struggle, and it prevailed because its internal promotion system was better suited than dynastic 
succession to the American political conditions and, more generally, to the American way of life. The 
very special conditions of American history enabled American politics to anticipate the concentration 
of the owners' interests in the way predicted by our politics-business co-evolution hypothesis: in one 
case, approximated by a dispersed equilibrium, the causation initially operated from politics to forms 
of business organization. 
The historical conditions necessary for a concentrated equilibrium were quite commonly in 
place. In many other countries, some form of concentration of ownership interests went together with 
the growth of large-scale enterprises, and family dynasties were usually involved in the management 
of firms and in the appointment of managers. In many cases, financial institutions made the exercise of 
this power compatible with the needs of large-scale enterprises by making “other people’s money” 
available to the “economic royalists”. The limited diversification of risks and the poor incentives for 
professional managers were (partially) off-set by the acquisition of many important management jobs 
by the ruling families and by a decrease in the agency problems arising from the separation between 
ownership and control. The inability of politics to anticipate the “armament of capitalism” 
subsequently induced a political reaction to arm labour by concentrating and organising its interests. 
Since, in most countries, politics had been unable to limit the concentration of the ownership interests, 
the resulting model of corporate governance provoked a “social democratic” political reaction. Thus,  
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in most European countries the direction of the causation was consistent with the general prediction 
concerning the achievement of concentrated equilibria: politics reacted only belatedly to a model of 
corporate governance serving the concentrated interests of capitalist dynasties. 
Since each type of institutional equilibrium (concentrated or dispersed) tends to exhibit a 
remarkable degree of stability, the “political origins” of corporate governance - that is, the political 
conditions existing when big capitalist firms first emerged - are quite important and, in many cases, 
they have even irreversibly shaped the paths of co-evolution followed by politics and corporate 
governance. However, in some cases, certain economic and political processes have shifted the 
economy from one co-evolution path to the other, and during the transition, the organization of 
corporate governance and labour market institutions has been mismatched.  
The UK is a particularly interesting case because it has gone through a long period of institutional 
mismatch. It has undergone a difficult transition from a politics-business co-evolution path based on 
well-established family dynasties and well-organized trade unions to a model of “popular capitalism” 
based on dispersed ownership and weaker unions. In the UK an open aristocracy led the revolt against 
the King and mutated into an entrepreneurial class. Some form of aristocratic family capitalism had an 
important role in the first, and mainly British, industrial revolution and preserved its dynastic power at 
the time of the second industrial revolution. However, by that time, according to Chandler (1990), this 
type of capitalism had become outdated. The new industries which developed in the second half of the 
nineteenth century required some form of managerial capitalism. In Chandler’s view, this explains the 
relative decadence of British capitalism at the time of the second industrial revolution.  
Early unionization and a deep sense of class division made Britain a case close to that of 
concentrated equilibrium. However, certain forces slowly produced a substantial mutation in the 
characteristics of British capitalism. The transmission and division of inheritance, coupled with the 
international role of the City, produced a dispersion of property. For some time the fragmentation of 
firms' ownership did not involve a comparable loss of centralized control, which remained confined to 
the usual social and family circles. Indeed, in the 1970s the UK was characterized by a situation of 
“institutional disequilibrium” where the traditionally well-organized British unions were not matched 
by a countervailing centralization of firms' ownership. This period coincided with a crisis of the 
British economy which at times seemed to be leading to “continental solutions”, such as pyramids and 
cross-share holding on the one hand, and “responsible” centralization of union activity on the other 
(Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2005). These “continental solutions”, however, were opposed by the City. 
Eventually, the Thatcher government made a sharp move towards a dispersed type of institutional 
equilibrium characterised by strong limitations on union activities and by a (much advertised) popular  
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shareholding capitalism. These arrangements have not been substantially reversed by the subsequent 
Labour Party governments
7. 
The UK’s transition shows how the “political origins” of a certain country exert a long-lasting 
but not decisive influence on the characteristics of its economic system. They may be eventually 
reversed by some combination of spontaneous economic processes and conscious government 
policies. Explanation cannot rely solely on the allegedly permanent effects of “exogenous” origins and 
should instead focus on the multiple paths of interaction between politics and business. Some co-
evolution paths may be upset by sudden shocks and by slow cumulative changes. For limited periods 
of their histories, some countries may experience painful transitions from one path to another and be 
out of any sort of “institutional equilibrium”. However, if in the long run these co-evolution paths 
work as “institutional attractors” for a sufficiently large number of countries, relations such as those 
considered in Figure 1 should be apparent. In this sense, our co-evolution hypothesis is intended to 
explain the characteristics of alternative systems of corporate governance.  
In the next section, we will try to quantify which model can better predict these institutional 
attractors that are taken at a certain moment of time. However, we wish to point out that the 
institutional changes that have occurred through time in specific countries can also offer a qualitative 
test for the different theories and we will conclude this section by trying to show that in this respect 
the co-evolution approach can offer a more convincing explanation of these changes.  
According to legal origins theory, “common law systems” account for the emergence of public 
companies. This theory puts the US and the UK in the same category, but this does not fit with the fact 
that until recently the UK had “continental features” and could have easily become completely 
“continental”. British institutions have moved closer to the US model only after the strong policies of 
Margaret Thatcher – a fact that it is difficult to conciliate with the legal origins theory but fits nicely 
with the explanation with the co-evolution approach. 
Moreover, the co-evolution hypothesis is consistent with the case of Switzerland, which poses a 
rather difficult problem for the legal origins explanation. In terms of its legal system, Switzerland is 
clearly part of the continental tradition, and it is difficult to attribute the dispersed nature of ownership 
of its large firms to different legal origins. By contrast, Switzerland fits very well with the co-evolution 
hypothesis, for it is the only European country where, like in the US, the political role of the landed 
aristocracy had vanished by the time of the second industrial revolution. Moreover, again like the US, 
Switzerland had a precocious democratic federal political system with little sense of continental class 
divisions. Well before England, most Swiss Cantons were able to fulfil the political conditions for a 
“dispersed equilibrium” and fit the bottom-left corners of Figure 1.  
                                                 
7  However the British metamorphosis from a regime of strong shareholders and strong stakeholders to one of weak 
shareholders and weak stakeholders has not gone so far as the single adjective “Anglo-American” model of corporate 
governance would imply. According to Gelter (2009), British legal arrangements stand in between the European-Continental 
and the American models.  
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A similar “historical” objection could be raised against theories that link corporate governance 
with political electoral systems. With the same electoral system, Britain moved from family capitalism 
to more managerial forms of corporate governance; and with some complicated, often proportional, 
electoral rules, Switzerland had a co-evolution path relatively close to that of the US. 
The qualitative historical evidence cited in this section provides some support for our hypothesis, 
but it is far from being conclusive. Each model and each explanation can have its exceptions and 
shortcomings, and one cannot rely solely on arguments focused on particular historical instances 
concerning specific countries.  In this respect, a quantitative evaluation of the competing models has 
obvious advantages.  
 
3. Comparing models: a Bayesian approach 
3.1 Empirical strategy and motivation 
In this section we adopt a Bayesian perspective in estimation and model comparison to assess the 
empirical validity of the co-evolution approach relatively to the other two theories prevailing in the 
existing literature. Bayesian estimation is implemented by combining data likelihood with prior 
information to compute the posterior densities (Zellner, 1971). Bayesian model comparison is 
performed by using the posterior odds ratios (Jeffreys, 1961).
8 According to this approach, all 
uncertainty (about the model, about variables’ selection, and about the unknown parameters) is 
expressed in terms of probability distributions, and relies on a few simple rules of the probability 
theory. While a more detailed description of the employed strategy is reported in the Appendix A.1, in 
the remainder of this subsection we motivate the choice of the Bayesian approach in the present 
context.  
First, as already mentioned in this paper, several recent studies have offered data evidence on 
alternative explanations for employment protection on the one hand (Botero et al., 2004; Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005) and for corporate governance on the other (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999, 2006; Mueller 
and Philippon, 2007;  Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Roe, 2003). From this it follows that if one intends to 
study the co-determination of employment protection and ownership concentration without resorting 
to an arbitrary variable selection procedure, one needs to control for a long list of regressors. When an 
unquestioned structural theoretical model is not available (as in our case), model uncertainty is crucial. 
What is required in this context is to investigate the relative importance of one model with respect to 
another considering all the models that cannot be rejected by the data. The Bayesian methodology 
allows explicit account to be taken of model uncertainty when implementing model comparisons. 
Second, we choose Bayesian econometrics because of small sample data limitations. As frequently 
happens in cross-country analyses, our sample is small (47 data points). In the presence of only few 
                                                 
8  See also Gelfand and Dey (1994), Geweke (1999) and Pettit and Young (1990).  
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observations, empirical distributions do not proxy limiting distributions. Furthermore, as shown by 
James and Stein (1960) and Efron and Morris (1971, 1972), when the number of parameters is large 
with respect to the number of observations, Bayesian approaches are superior to frequentist 
approaches in terms of parameter estimates (Gelman and Rubin, 1995; see also Raftery, 1995). If prior 
information on the parameters of interest is available, it can then be used to select the list of regressors 
to include in the model, and to assign prior distributions to the corresponding parameters that represent 
the basis for inference. In the next sub-sections we therefore consider a simultaneous two-equation 
model for labour protection-and-ownership concentration determination, taking into account the 
existing theories as well as the co-evolution argument. The specification of the benchmark model as 
well as that of the models used in the robustness checks are motivated by the most relevant previous 
empirical studies (Botero et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 2006; Pagano and Volpin, 2005) as explained in 
the next section. 
3.2 Model specification and data details 
Employing a cross-section sample of 47 economies,
9 we estimate the following simultaneous two-
equation model (SEM): 
,      
   
2 12 11 10 9 8 7 2
1 6 5 4 3 2 1 1
ε β β β β β β α
ε β β β β β β α
+ + + + + + + =
+ + + + + + + =
gdp Log jud Eff prot Sh op Pr Union Common Concentr
gdp Log gov Eff Left op Pr Concentr Common Labour
  (1) 
where the error terms,  1 ε  and  2 ε , are i.i.d.  ) , 0 ( 2
1ε σ N  and  ) , 0 ( 2
2ε σ N , respectively. The dependent 
variable in the first equation, Labour (Botero et al., 2004), is an index between 0 and 1 and measures 
the protection of labour and employment laws in 1997 including: cost and existence of alternative 
employment contracts, cost of increasing hours worked, cost of firing workers, and dismissal 
procedures.
10 The other index usually adopted by the empirical literature for labour protection is the 
OECD index (OECD, 2009). The latter has a narrower definition with respect to Botero et al.’s 
variable; it is an indicator of the strictness of regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary 
contracts based on procedures and costs of dismissing individuals or groups of workers and of hiring 
workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts. We have chosen to use Botero et al.’s 
index in our basic specification for two reasons: first, because it is available for the largest number of 
countries (47 data points); second, because it allows comparability with Botero et al.’s results which 
represent the most influential evidence on the determinants of the regulation of labour existent in the 
                                                 
9 Countries included in the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, US, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
10 A critical assessment of the data collected by Botero et al. (2004) and of their econometric approach is offered by Pozen 
(2007).  
  12
present literature. Nonetheless, in the robustness checks, we also use the OECD index, the sample of 
countries consequently shrinking to 24 economies. 
The dependent variable of the second equation, Concentr (La Porta et al., 1999), represents an 
ownership concentration index between 0 and 1 and measures the “common shares owned by the top 
three shareholders in the ten largest non financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country” 
at the end of 1995 (La Porta et al., 2006: 9). We allow ownership concentration to affect labour 
regulation: Concentr also enters the first equation as an explanatory (albeit endogenous) variable. A 
positive sign for the related coefficient indicates a political reaction by labour to concentrated 
corporate governance forms in terms of stronger protection (Belloc and Pagano, 2009). On the other 
hand, when politics is able to anticipate economic forces, corporate governance forms may react to the 
concentration of labour interests and strong unionization. We therefore include Union density (Botero 
et al., 2004) as an explanatory variable in the ownership concentration equation. This variable is the 
union density rate in 1997, and it proxies the degree of workers’ rights representation. In the 
robustness checks we estimate the model also using Left (La Porta et al., 2006) in place of Union 
density. Left is a measure of the left power, and corresponds to the percentage of years between 1975 
and 1995 during which the political orientation of the executive was leftist. The effect of the electoral 
systems is captured by the variable Prop (Pagano and Volpin, 2005) which stands for 1986-1990 
average proportionality. The proportionality index equals 3 if 100% of the seats are assigned by 
proportional rule, equals 2 if the majority of the seats are assigned by proportional rule, 1 if the 
proportional rule applies to the minority of the seats, and 0 otherwise. Finally the legal theory is 
represented by the variable Common (La Porta et al., 1998) which is a dummy variable for common 
legal origins. 
Control variables used in system estimation are suggested by the empirical literature already 
mentioned in this paper (see table 1 columns 5 and 6 for detailed references). Eff government 
(Kaufman et al.,  2003) is a proxy for government effectiveness in 2000 and takes account of the 
quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, 
the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies. It ranges between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher values standing for higher 
government effectiveness. Eff judiciary (International Country Risk Guide – Political Risk Services, 
1996) measures the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment considering its impact on 
business. It ranges between 0 and 10 and is calculated between 1980 and 1983. Shareholder protection 
is the 1993-2001 average of the index for anti-director rights (La Porta et al., 1998) updated by Pagano 
and Volpin (2005). It is obtained by adding 1 when: shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy vote; 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares before the general shareholder meeting; 
cumulative voting or proportional representation of minority shareholders is permitted; there exist 
mechanisms for protection of oppressed minorities; the minimum percentage of share capital required 
to convene an extraordinary shareholders meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent; finally,  
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shareholders are invested with pre-emptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders meeting. 
Log gdp (La Porta et al., 2006) is the logarithm of per capita GDP in US dollars in 2000. Other 
variables used in the robustness checks are: the Union index (Botero et al., 2004) assesses the statutory 
protection and power of unions and is computed by averaging seven dummies for respectively: 
employees’ unionization rights, employees’ collective bargaining rights, employees’ legal duty to 
bargain with unions, collective contracts extended to third parties by law, closed shops allowed by 
law, workers’ or unions’ representation on the Boards of Directors, workers’ councils mandatory by 
law; the Collective relations index (Botero et al., 2004) corresponds to a measure of protection of 
collective relations laws and is computed as the average of the index for labour union power and the 
index for protection of workers in collective disputes; the Social security index (Botero et al., 2004) is 
obtained as the average of three indexes gauging the level of benefits for respectively: old age, 
disability and death, sickness and health, and unemployment. The fact that the variables used in the 
analysis are measured in different reference periods is not an issue here since the cross-section 
variation largely dominates the variation over time. 
Table 1 lists all the variables involved with summary statistics. It also reports the expected sign 
relatively to each equation and gives a reference to previous data evidence for the suggested relation. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Expected sign  Variable Mean  St.Dev.  N.  obs. 
Labour Eq.  Ownership Eq. 
Labour index  0.4574 0.1846  48  (dependent)   
Concentration  0.4272 0.1385  49  +  (BP09)  (dependent) 
Union density  0.2959  0.2233  48  + (Bot04)    + (Roe03, BP09) 
Common law  0.3542 0.4833  48  - (Bot04)  - (LP06) 
Proportionality  0.6473  0.4300  47  + (PV05)  + (PV05) 
Eff government  0.8006 1.0192  49 +  (Bot04)   
Log gdp  8.7558  1.4749  49  + (Bot04)  + (LP06) 
Sh prot  3.2766 1.2283  47    - (LP06) 
Eff  judiciary  7.6665 2.0507  49    - (LP06) 
Left power  0.3375  0.2908  49  + (Bot04)  + (LP06) 
EPL OECD index  2.2697 1.1037  24  (dependent)   
Relations index  0.4410 0.1408  48  (dependent)   
Union index  0.4385      0.2020  48  (dependent)   
Social security index  0.6160      0.1999  48  (dependent)   
Note: Abbreviations in brackets in columns 4 and 5 stand respectively for: BP09 = Belloc and Pagano (2009), Bot04 
= Botero et al. (2004), Roe03 = Roe (2003), LP06 = La Porta et al. (2006), PV05 = Pagano and Volpin (2005). 
 
Defining ]' , [ Concentr Labour y = , ]' ,   , ,   , , , , , 1 [ gdp   Log jud Eff prot   h S gov Eff Left op Pr Union Common x =  
and  ]' , [ 2 1 ε ε ε = , model (1) may also be written in compact notation as:  
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, B Γ ε + = x y                                                                  (2) 
where ε  is i.i.d.  ) , 0 ( 1
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 is the precision matrix. Since Γ is an upper triangular matrix (and so is its inverse, 
1 − Γ ), the system may be solved recursively and the necessary condition for identification is met. 
Furthermore, the triangular structure of (2) implies that det(Γ) = 1, and as a consequence its likelihood 
function is the same as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR hereafter) model. The structural form 
of the model can thus be estimated directly using methods developed for SUR models, thereby settling 
the important prior elicitation and identification issues associated with SEM Bayesian estimation (see 
van Dijk, 2002; Richard and Steel, 1988; Koop, 2003; Koop and Tobias, 2003; and Koop, Poirer and 
Tobias, 2004). From (2), the reduced form of model (1) may be written as:  
, η + Φ = x y                                                                     (3) 
where  B 1 − Γ = Φ  is the matrix of parameters, and  ε η 1 − Γ =  is the matrix of error terms. We assume η  
to be i.i.d.  ) , 0 ( 1
N I H N ⊗ − ,  1 1 1 − − − Γ Σ Γ = H  being the 2×2 precision matrix. Bayesian inference 
requires prior information about the unknown parameters Φ and 
1 − H , which are supposed to be 
independent. The marginal distribution of Φ is Normal (N) and such that Φ∼ ) , (
1 −
Φ Π H N , while the 
marginal distribution of H is Wishart (W) with v  degrees of freedom and mean equal to 
1 − S v , i.e. 
H ∼ ) , (
1 v S W
− . 
3.3 Enumeration of priors 
Before turning to the estimation results we need to enumerate our priors, which are summarized in 
table 2. PRIOR1 is a diffused one where data evidence dominates the posterior outcome. All the 
parameters are assumed to follow a Normal distribution with mean equal to 0 and standard error equal 
to 5. The regression coefficients are all set at the point corresponding to no effects on the dependent 
variables, but the large variance considerably spreads the density around the prior. This is equivalent 
to saying that we presume ignorance about model parameters. PRIOR2 is informative and reflects 
expectations about the relation between the variables considered as it is suggested by the three 
competing theories. Let us start from the first equation (Labour protection). The legal origins theory 
(La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Djankov et al., 2003) sustains that institutions are shaped by the legal 
tradition that characterizes the various countries. In particular, the coefficient on Common is expected 
to be negative as documented by Botero et al. (2004): we then assign to the prior mean value -0.5 and 
to the prior standard deviation value 0.5. The electoral systems approach postulates a positive relation 
between proportionality of the voting system and strictness of the employment protection legislation,  
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as supported by data evidence offered by Pagano and Volpin (2005). Thus, the coefficient on Prop is 
set to have prior mean equal to 0.5 and prior standard error equal to 0.5. The co-evolution approach 
(empirical evidence supplied by Belloc and Pagano, 2009) maintains that stronger concentration of the 
block holders is likely to provoke a social democratic reaction leading to an increase of the workers’ 
rights protection. This suggests a positive coefficient on the Concentration variable so that, again, we 
set prior mean and prior standard error both equal to 0.5. By contrast, we do not impose any 
informative prior on the parameters on the control variables, letting the data speak: prior mean is set 
equal to 0 and prior standard error equal to 5. We proceed in a similar way as regards the second 
equation (Ownership concentration). The legal origins theory maintains that the Anglo-American 
model has old roots in the common law traditions. Only in common law countries private owners, 
including the minority shareholders of large firms, could be properly protected, making it possible the 
separation between ownership and control. According to this view Common is expected to have a 
negative effect on Concentration: prior mean is set equal to -0.5 and prior standard error equal to 0.5. 
As implied by the electoral system approach, the coefficient on Prop is, on the contrary, predicted to 
be positive, so we set the prior mean equal to 0.5, with prior standard deviation equal to 0.5; whereas, 
as hinted by the co-evolution approach, the coefficient on Union density, capturing the influence of 
labour interest groups, has a positive anticipated sign and, accordingly, the prior mean has an assigned 
value 0.5, the prior standard deviation being equal to 0.5. Again, we retain strong uncertainty on all the 
control variables (zero prior means and prior standard errors equal to 5). PRIOR3 further restricts the 
range within which parameters are allowed to move and, while maintaining the prior means as 
specified in PRIOR2, sets prior standard errors equal to 0.25 for the coefficients associated to the three 
competing theories.  
 
Table 2. Priors 
Variable PRIOR1  PRIOR2  PRIOR3 
Labour equation 
Common law  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (-0.5, 0.5)  Normal (-0.5, 0.25) 
Concentration  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (0.5, 0.5)  Normal (0.5, 0.25) 
Prop  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (0.5, 0.5)  Normal (0.5, 0.25) 
All other variables  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (0, 5) 
Ownership concentration equation 
Common law  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (-0.5, 0.5)  Normal (-0.5, 0.25) 
Union density  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (0.5, 0.5)  Normal (0.5, 0.25) 
Prop  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (0.5, 0.5)  Normal (0.5, 0.25) 
All other variables  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (0, 5)  Normal (0, 5) 
H ∼ () 2 , 0 2 2× W  
 
Finally, we always maintain uninformative priors on the relevant parameters for H( v S ,
1 − ) which is 
assumed to be distributed as a Wishart with two degrees of freedom (equal to the number of equations)  
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and zero mean for each element of the matrix, i.e. H ∼ ( ) 2 , 0 2 2× W . The reason for this choice is that 
more informative priors are considered too restrictive by the relevant literature (see in particular Dreze 
and Richard, 1983). Information on the three priors is summarized in table 2. 
3.4 Estimation results 
Our two-simultaneous equation model is estimated using the Gibbs sampler (Gelfand and Smith, 1990; 
Tanner, 1993). This is a method for posterior simulation widely adopted in linear regression model 
settings. We take 55,000 replications, with 5,000 burn-in replications discarded and the remaining 
50,000 retained to compute the posterior features of interest. 
Table 3 presents our estimation output. As will be seen, the results from respectively PRIOR1, 
PRIOR2 and PRIOR3 are very similar, suggesting that data information is predominant.
11 All signs are 
as expected and, from a frequentist perspective, the posterior means of the regression coefficients 
(reported in columns 2, 6 and 10 respectively for the three priors, with posterior standard errors in 
brackets) always fall within the highest posterior density interval
12 (HPDI) at least at the 5% 
confidence level (listed in columns 3, 7 and 11). We can observe that the three competing approaches 
all find support from the data. The found negative effect of the common law dummy on both workers’ 
and block holders’ interests concentration corroborates the predictions of the legal origins theory; the 
positive effect of the proportionality of the voting system variable on both ownership concentration 
and labour protection is consistent with the electoral systems approach; finally, the positive effect of 
the ownership concentration on labour protection and that of the unionization rate on ownership 
concentration confirm the expectations suggested by the co-evolution approach. The estimated 
parameters on the control variables, on which we have retained uninformative priors, also present 
sensible signs. In the labour equation, the positive and significant value of the parameter on the left 
power variable is consistent with the view put forward by Olson (1965, 1993) and empirically 
documented by Botero et al. (2004) that institutions transfer resources to individuals that are endowed 
with political power; accordingly workers rights are predicted to be protected by stricter regulation 
when the government has a leftist orientation. The efficiency theory (North, 1981; Demsetz, 1967) 
maintains that governments select labour market interventions to cure market failures so to maximize 
social welfare: richer countries are then expected to regulate less as they have fewer market failures to 
heal. Accordingly, we find that the logarithm of the per capita GDP has a negative impact on the 
strictness of labour protection. Finally, our data evidence reasonably suggests that countries 
characterized by more effective governments have less protective employment and collective relations 
laws. With regard to the ownership equation, we find that the three control variables, the shareholder 
protection, the efficiency of the judiciary system and the logarithm of the per capita GDP, all have a 
                                                 
11 Estimated prior and posterior densities relative to PRIOR3 are reported in Appendix B available from the authors upon 
request. 
12 See Koop (2003), pp. 43-45. Table 3: Posterior results 
  Prior 1 (uninformative)  Prior 2 (informative)  Prior 3 (informative) 
Coefficient  Post mean
(post se)  HPDI 95%  NSE  CD  Post mean
(post se)  HPDI 95%  NSE  CD  Post mean
(post se)  HPDI 95%  NSE  CD 
Labour equation 
Constant  -0.2875 
(0.7568) 
[-1.6146  0.7349]  0.0232 0.0658 0.0632 
(0.4807) 
[-0.7659 0.7981]  0.0071 0.6160 0.1946 
(0.4024) 
[-0.4832  0.8382]  0.0052 0.6680 
Common  -0.1068 
(0.1041) 
[-0.2548  0.0786]  0.0018 -0.0423 -0.1361 
(0.0785) 
[-0.2561 -0.0004]  0.0006 -0.9052 -0.1465 
(0.0707) 
[-0.2578  -0.0267] 0.0005 0.1883 
Concentr  1.4104 
(0.8110) 
[0.3432  2.8416]  0.0270 -0.0251 0.9994 
(0.4611) 
[0.2976 1.7989]  0.0082 -0.7411 0.8496 
(0.3583) 
[0.2736  1.4518]  0.0058 -0.4859 
Prop   0.1346 
(0.1034) 
[-0.0410  0.2930]  0.0010 -0.7243 0.1474 
(0.0825) 
[0.0098 0.2802]  0.0004 0.7865 0.1527 
(0.0763) 
[0.0260  0.2762]  0.0003 0.1491 
Left power  0.1079 
(0.0729) 
[-0.0115  0.2281]  0.0004 -0.1075 0.1108 
(0.0723) 
[-0.0067 0.2307]  0.0004 1.0297 0.1110 
(0.0719) 
[-0.0065  0.2298]  0.0004 0.0111 
Eff gov  0.1008 
(0.0440) 
[0.0279  0.1727]  0.0002 -0.2034 0.0984 
(0.0442) 
[0.0255 0.1712]  0.0002 -1.0955 0.0977 
(0.0439) 
[0.0250  0.1696]  0.0002 0.9300 
Log gdp  -0.0108 
(0.0519) 
[-0.0878  0.0788]  0.0012 -0.0755 -0.0283 
(0.0407) 
[-0.0926 0.0407]  0.0004 -0.4268 -0.0352 
(0.0376) 
[-0.0961  0.0275]  0.0003 -0.9516 
Ownership concentration  equation 
Constant  0.9101 
(0.1160) 
[0.7197  1.1010]  0.0005 -0.3381 0.9148 
(0.1180) 
[0.7209 1.1086]  0.0005 -0.4491 0.9159 
(0.1187) 
[0.7228  1.1108]  0.0004 0.5832 
Common  -0.0325 
(0.0449) 
[-0.1058  0.0420]  0.0003 -0.0132 -0.0273 
(0.0450) 
[-0.1010 0.0468]  0.0002 0.5565 -0.0262 
(0.0453) 
[-0.1003  0.0486]  0.0002 -1.3166 
Union dens  0.0756 
(0.0665) 
[-0.0306  0.1844]  0.0007 -0.2373 0.0860 
(0.0730) 
[-0.0331 0.2055]  0.0005 -1.8850 0.0917 
(0.0754) 
[-0.0317  0.2159]  0.0003 0.0541 
Prop   0.0049 
(0.0482) 
[-0.0748  0.0836]  0.0003 0.6872 0.0016 
(0.0484) 
[-0.0787 0.0808]  0.0002 -0.2474 0.0001 
(0.0485) 
[-0.0798  0.0793]  0.0002 -0.7071 
Sh prot  -0.0179 
(0.0104) 
[-0.0365  -0.0028]  0.0001 -0.1996 -0.0206 
(0.0109) 
[-0.0393 -0.0037]  0.0001 -1.3641 -0.0215 
(0.0112) 
[-0.0405  -0.0037] 0.0001 0.4195 
Eff jud  -0.0174 
(0.0090) 
[-0.0328  -0.0043]  0.0001 0.0909 -0.0199 
(0.0094) 
[-0.0357 -0.0051]  0.0001 -0.2616 -0.0207 
(0.0097) 
[-0.0370  -0.0050] 0.0001 0.3621 
Log gdp  -0.0298 
(0.0160) 
[-0.0555  -0.0030]  0.0001 0.1555 -0.0276 
(0.0165) 
[-0.0544 -0.0002]  0.0001 1.1426 -0.0268 
(0.0168) 
[-0.0539  0.0010]  0.0001 -0.4286 




negative effect on ownership concentration, consistently with results provided by La Porta et al. (2006). 
Turning to the diagnostics, assessing the accuracy of the numerical approximations is essential in 
order to present reliable results with the Gibbs sampler. Following Geweke (1992), we report the 
numerical standard errors (NSE) for the approximations of the point estimates, and the convergence 
diagnostics (CD).
13 As will be noticed, the computed NSE (listed in columns 4, 8 and 12) are very small 
relative to posterior standard deviations of all the parameters (reported in brackets in column 2) and 
indicate a high degree of accuracy despite the limited number of observations. The CD, which test the 
difference between the point estimates based on the first 10,000 replications (after the burn-in 
replications) and that based on the last 10,000, are shown in columns 5, 9 and 13. As will be seen, the 
values obtained for the CD statistics are always smaller than the critical values from the standard 
Normal statistical table. 
3.5 Model comparisons 
Model comparison is implemented by Bayes factors.
14 First, we compare nested models: for each of the 
three theories considered, we compare the full model (M0) with an abridged model where the coefficient 
representing theory i is set to have zero prior mean and zero prior standard error (M-i). This is equivalent 
to saying that we constrain the associated variable to have no effect on the dependent variable, thereby 
challenging the relevance of our informative priors and the relevance of the corresponding theory. More 
in detail, we proceed as follows. We compute the posterior log-likelihood of the full model, ) ( 0 Y|M p , 
the posterior log-likelihood of the abridged model, ) ( i - Y|M p , and then take the ratio between the two, 
obtaining the Bayes’ factor:  ) ( ) ( i - 0 i Y|M /p Y|M p B = . Bi >1 indicates that the full model is more likely 
than the abridged model in explaining the data: thus the theory representing model i is supported by the 
evidence. By contrast, Bi < 1 suggests that the abridged model is preferable to the full model in terms of 
(log-)likelihood maximization, so that the theory considered is to be discarded. 
Our results are shown in table 4 (columns 2, 3 and 4), and are commented on below relying on the 
rule of thumb suggested by Jeffreys (1961).
15 As one can notice, the three approaches all find support 
from the data, which is always stronger when PRIOR3 is considered. Interestingly, the ownership 
concentration variable in the labour equation presents a Bayes factor in its favor larger than 200. This 
furnishes decisive support for the associated co-evolution theory.  
Second, we perform non-nested model comparisons by running pairwise “horse races” between the 
three theories considered. Let us denote the full model by M0, the abridged model without the effect 
suggested by theory i by M-i, and the abridged model without the effect proposed by theory j by M-j. 
Comparisons are then implemented simply computing the ratio of the two Bayes factors between the 
                                                 
13 See Appendix A.3 for technical details and Koop (2003), pp. 66-68, for a more general treatment. 
14 See Appendix A.2 for technical details, Koop (2003), pp. 38-43, for a more general treatment, and Gawande (1998) for a 
paper adopting a similar methodology (but with a completely different focus). 
15 (i) 1 < Bij < 3.16: the evidence slightly supports Mi. (ii)  3.16 < Bij < 10: the evidence moderately supports Mi. (iii) 10 < Bij < 




full and abridged models, M-i and M-j, obtaining  ) | ( / ) | ( / j - i - j i ij M Y p M Y p B B B = = . If Bij > 1, we 
can conclude that M-j (model without effect for theory j) is more likely than M-i (model without effect 
for theory i) given the data, providing that theory i is a better explanation of the data than theory j. Note 
that this should not be interpreted as decisive proof of the validity of one model against another, but 
rather as a measure of relative support. 
As regards the first equation we compare the abridged model for each theory (from time to time 
denoted by M-j) with the model with no ownership concentration effect (M-i). As will be noticed in table 
4 (columns 6, 7 and 8), the latter is always dismissed by the Bayes factor test. The experiment thus 
indicates that the concentration variable is more influential than the proxy for common law and that for 
the proportionality of the electoral system in the determination of workers rights. With regard to the 
ownership concentration equation, we instead compare the various abridged models (from time to time 
denoted by M-j) with the model where the “social democracy” effect is assumed not to work (M-i). We 
find that Roe’s argument is preferred by the data against the legal origins and the electoral systems 
approaches although the value of the Bayes factor only suggests slight evidence against the former. 
 
Table 4. Model comparisons 










Legal origins  3.2578 19.4947 32.3401 Legal origins  68.4207 18.3843  11.0804
Co-evolution  222.9011 358.3966 358.3414 Co-evolution  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Electoral systems  5.4107 21.8082 32.3308 Electoral systems  41.1964 16.4340 11.0836
Ownership concentration equation 
Legal origins  1.2445 2.6393 2.9499 Legal origins  2.4374 3.0518 3.0763
Co-evolution   3.0334 8.0547 9.0749 Co-evolution  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Electoral systems  0.9321 2.4386 2.6901 Electoral systems  3.2544 3.3030 3.3734
NOTE: Total number of retained replications is 50,000, number of burn-in replications is 5,000. 
3.6 Robustness checks 
In this section we gauge the robustness of our previous conclusions. Since the three priors yield very 
consistent results, we only report the estimation output relative to PRIOR3.  
First, following La Porta et al. (2006), we replace Union density with the proxy for left power as 
regressor in the ownership concentration equation. This variable captures the negative effect of “social 




power equal to 0.5 and prior standard deviation equal to 0.25. The results are given in table 5, from 
which it will be seen that our qualitative conclusions are substantially unaltered.  
 
Table 5: Robustness checks – Left power as proxy for social democracy (PRIOR3) 
Coeff.  P. mean 
(p. se)  HPDI 95%  NSE  CD  Coeff. P.mean 
(p. se) HPDI 95%  NSE  CD 
Const  0.2711 
(0.4055) 
[-0.4173 0.9153]  0.0041 -0.6112 Const  0.8643 
(0.1191)
[0.6681 1.0588]  0.0005 -0.4281
Comm  -0.1418 
(0.0717) 
[-0.2532 -0.0187]  0.0005 1.1468 Comm -0.0299 
(0.0453)
[-0.1047 0.0443]  0.0002 -0.8790
Conc  0.7966 
(0.3737) 




[-0.0273 0.1837]  0.0003 -0.5448
Prop  0.1644 
(0.0755) 
[0.0402 0.2874]  0.0003 -0.7201 Prop   0.0022 
(0.0473)



























[-0.0478 0.0078]  0.0001 0.0830
NOTE: Total number of retained replications is 50,000, number of burn-in replications is 5,000. 
 
Second, we check for the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the labour protection index as a 
measure of workers’ rights protection. Botero et al. (2004) provide several measures for such a variable: 
the Relation index, the Union index, and the Social security index. We estimate our SEMs by adopting 
the three indexes one after the other as the dependent variable in the first equation (output is reported in 
table 6). Again, our main results are broadly consistent with the basic estimation, the only difference 
being relative to the left power variable and the log per capita GDP whose coefficients in the labour 
equation turns out respectively negative and positive, but very small, when the union index and the 
collective relations index are used. 
Third, it may be argued that the index for shareholder protection rights representation is 
endogenous (La Porta et al., 2006). To deal with this possible objection, we estimate the three-equation 
SEM reported below:  
3 14 13 12 11 3
2 10 9 8 7 2
1 6 5 4 3 2 1 1
ε β β β β α
ε β β β β α
ε β β β β β β α
+ + + + + =
+ + + + + =
+ + + + + + + =
gdp   Log op Pr jud   Eff Common prot   Sh
gdp   Log jud   Eff prot   Sh Union Concentr
gdp   Log gov   Eff Left op Pr Concentr Common Labour
       (4) 
In the model specification we follow La Porta et al. (2006) who used common law as an instrument for 
shareholders’ protection excluded from the ownership concentration equation. This specification also 
provides a more proper representation of the model proposed by Pagano and Volpin (2005) who focus  
on the simultaneous determination of labour protection and shareholders’ protection (not of ownership 
concentration). Previous evidence (La Porta et al., 1999; Pagano and Volpin, 2005) suggest theTable 6: Robustness checks – Alternative proxies for labour protection (PRIOR3) 
  Union index   Collective relations index   Social security index  
Coeff.  P. mean
(p. se)  HPDI 95%  NSE  CD  P. mean
(p. se)  HPDI 95%  NSE  CD  P. mean
(p. se)  HPDI 95%  NSE  CD 
Labour equation 
Constant  -0.2874 
(0.4594)
[-1.0528  0.4555]  0.0050  -0.2848  -0.2594 
(0.3888)
[-0.9168 0.3595] 0.0057  0.5686  -0.6884 
(0.5347)
[-1.5811  0.1764] 0.0083  -0.4934 
Common  -0.1521 
(0.0730)
[-0.2674 -0.0280]  0.0006  0.9481  -0.0607 
(0.0532)
[-0.1432  0.0297] 0.0005  -0.2783  0.0042 
(0.0722)
[-0.1098  0.1252] 0.0007  0.1993 
Concentr  0.6335 
(0.4146)
[-0.0429  1.3166]  0.0057  0.2160  0.4002 
(0.3795)
[-0.2000  1.0407] 0.0067  -0.5071  0.2534 
(0.5143)
[-0.5793  1.1068] 0.0094  0.5308 
Prop   0.1256 
(0.0778)
[-0.0030  0.2520]  0.0003  0.1928  0.1291 
(0.0555)
[0.0362  0.2179] 0.0003  0.4734  0.0670 
(0.0753)
[-0.0571  0.1906] 0.0005  -0.4287 
Left  -0.0043 
(0.0842)
[-0.1428  0.1339]  0.0004  -0.4849  -0.0188 
(0.0617)
[-0.1201  0.0822] 0.0003  0.3621  0.0401 
(0.0886)
[-0.1049  0.1860] 0.0004  -0.0436 
Eff gov  -0.0640 
(0.0515)
[-0.1486  0.0206]  0.0002  0.7747  -0.0871 
(0.0383)
[-0.1501 -0.0241] 0.0002  0.3723  -0.0580 
(0.0548)
[-0.1475  0.0323] 0.0002  0.0389 
Log gdp  0.0508 
(0.0427)
[-0.0183  0.1214]  0.0003  0.1991  0.0593 
(0.0326)
[0.0068  0.1133] 0.0003  -0.6897  0.1327 
(0.0457)
[0.0583  0.2088] 0.0005  0.4335 
Ownership concentration  equation 
Constant  0.9114 
(0.1203)
[0.7129  1.1089]  0.0006  1.6488  0.9009 
(0.1189)
[0.7054  1.0959] 0.0005  -0.1441  0.8999 
(0.1219)
[0.6993  1.1003] 0.0006  -1.2714 
Common  -0.0407 
(0.0466)
[-0.1174  0.0357]  0.0002  -0.7347  -0.0400 
(0.0469)
[-0.1170  0.0373] 0.0002  0.8259  -0.0497 
(0.0490)
[-0.1305  0.0299] 0.0003  -0.2207 
Union  0.0966 
(0.0922)
[-0.0578  0.2439]  0.0006  0.1188  0.0219 
(0.0908)
[-0.1276  0.1718] 0.0005  0.0730  0.0295 
(0.1054)
[-0.1478  0.1994] 0.0009  0.0668 
Prop   0.0046 
(0.0495)
[-0.0774  0.0857]  0.0002  -0.5707  0.0188 
(0.0494)
[-0.0620  0.0997] 0.0002  0.3687  0.0206 
(0.0505)
[-0.0622  0.1038] 0.0003  1.4367 
Sh prot  -0.0121 
(0.0132)
[-0.0343  0.0088]  0.0001  -0.5666  -0.0147 
(0.0139)
[-0.0381  0.0075] 0.0001  -0.2553  -0.0091 
(0.0187)
[-0.0406  0.0208] 0.0002  0.7886 
Eff jud  -0.0176 
(0.0114)
[-0.0362  0.0012]  0.0001  -0.6763  -0.0126 
(0.0119)
[-0.0319  0.0073] 0.0001  -0.6214  -0.0106 
(0.0129)
[-0.0314  0.0107] 0.0001  -0.6360 
Log gdp  -0.0322 
(0.0178)
[-0.0612 -0.0030]  0.0001  -0.2060  -0.0331 
(0.0181)
[-0.0628 -0.0034] 0.0001  0.5242  -0.0367 
(0.0187)
[-0.0674 -0.0060] 0.0001  0.3352 




following informative priors for the shareholder protection equation in PRIOR3 (mean, standard error):  
Common (0.5, 0.25), Prop (-0.5, 0.25), Eff jud (0.5, 0.25), Log gdp (0.5, 0.25). The econometric results 
are set out in table 7. The posterior estimates are consistent with expectations, with the only exception 
of the coefficient on the government effectiveness variable in the first equation that is now positive. All 
the other parameters’ signs are as expected and the values always fall within the 5% HPDI. 
 
Table 7: Robustness checks – Endogenous shareholder protection (PRIOR3) 
Coeff.  P.mean 
(p. se)  HPDI 95%  NSE  CD 
Labour equation 
Constant  0.3502 
(0.4112) 
[-0.3483  1.0034]  0.0061  -0.0648 
Common  -0.1939 
(0.0503) 
[-0.2769  -0.1117]  0.0003  1.4493 
Concentration  0.7609 
(0.3853) 
[0.1418  1.4063]  0.0073  0.1482 
Prop   0.1613 
(0.0545) 
[0.0722  0.2513]  0.0003  0.2821 
Left power  0.1290 
(0.0711) 
[0.0129  0.2466]  0.0004  -0.2231 
Eff gov  0.1069 
(0.0434) 
[0.0357  0.1784]  0.0002  0.1946 
Log gdp  -0.0484 
(0.0373) 
[-0.1084  0.0138]  0.0003  -0.1270 
Ownership concentration equation 
Constant  0.8531 
(0.1153) 
[0.6632  1.0414]  0.0005  -0.8560 
Union  0.0974 
(0.0720) 
[-0.0195  0.2163]  0.0003  -0.0967 
Sh prot  -0.0034 
(0.0167) 
[-0.0301  0.0243]  0.0002  -0.3261 
Eff jud  -0.0247 
(0.0101) 
[-0.0417  -0.0088]  0.0001  -0.3940 
Log gdp  -0.0238 
(0.0155) 
[-0.0493  0.0015]  0.0001  1.3855 
Shareholder protection equation 
Constant  1.1955 
(0.9117) 
[-0.3111  2.6903]  0.0033  0.9443 
Common  1.1815 
(0.3263) 
[0.6433  1.7214]  0.0016  -0.3125 
Prop  -0.6248 
(0.3022) 
[-1.1200  -0.1267]  0.0013  -0.6204 
Eff jud  0.0276 
(0.1088) 
[-0.1502  0.2089]  0.0006  0.0885 
Log gdp  0.1788 
(0.1480) 
[-0.0665  0.4209]  0.0006  -0.3859 




Finally, as anticipated in section 3.2, we substitute Botero et al.’s index for employment protection, 
with the OECD index (OECD, 2009). In this case the sectional sample covers only OECD countries and 
number of the economies included shrinks to 24. As will be observed in table 8, again all the previous 
conclusions about the three competing theories remain unchanged. Regarding the control variables, it is 
however worth noting that, in the labour equation, the government effectiveness and the log per capita 
GDP have now a positive sign contrarily to previous findings. 
 
Table 8: Robustness checks – EPL OECD index (PRIOR3) 
Coeff.  P.mean 
(p. se)  HPDI 95%  NSE  CD 
Labour concentration  equation 
Constant  -1.2747 
(1.4205) 
[-3.5978  1.0584]  0.0062  0.2369 
Common  -0.7444 
(0.2855) 
[-1.2157  -0.2737]  0.0011  -0.2527 
Concentration  0.5805 
(0.4917) 
[-0.2340  1.3846]  0.0024  0.4042 
Prop   0.7976 
(0.3138) 
[0.2817  1.3118]  0.0011  -1.1776 
Left power  0.5765 
(0.5181) 
[-0.2752  1.4250]  0.0024  0.4920 
Eff gov  0.3223 
(0.2770) 
[-0.1280  0.7786]  0.0012  1.6243 
Log gdp  0.1631 
(0.1831) 
[-0.1385  0.4637]  0.0008  -0.4974 
Ownership concentration  equation 
Constant  0.9026 
(0.1199) 
[0.7048  1.0987]  0.0005  -0.4590 
Common  -0.0348 
(0.0486) 
[-0.1148  0.0456]  0.0002  -0.7641 
Union dens  0.0105 
(0.1004) 
[-0.1528  0.1756]  0.0004  -0.3647 
Prop   0.0214 
(0.0499) 
[-0.0598  0.1029]  0.0002  -0.6007 
Sh prot  -0.0203 
(0.0159) 
[-0.0464  0.0059]  0.0001  0.1172 
Eff jud  -0.0129 
(0.0138) 
[-0.0355  0.0098]  0.0001  0.7661 
Log gdp  -0.0311 
(0.0198) 
[-0.0633  0.0015]  0.0001  -0.0265 








4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have compared three different approaches to shareholders’ and workers’ interests 
protection: the legal, the political and the co-evolution approach. After illustrating the three competing 
views in a comparative perspective and discussing historical evidence supporting the co-evolution 
explanation, we have used Bayesian econometrics to test and contrast the three approaches on an 
empirical ground. In particular, we have gauged the empirical relevance of the co-evolution approach 
relatively to the other two theories that have received substantial empirical support and strong emphasis 
in the recent literature. We have concluded that the co-evolution argument cannot be ignored in the 
present debate: while the three theories all found support from the data, the co-evolution approach turns 
out at least as influential as the competing approaches in explaining shareholder and worker protection 
determination. We believe that this finding has important policy implications that we briefly consider in 
what follows. 
The approaches focusing on legal and electoral systems contained a clear policy implication: one 
should reform these systems to allow the coming of a particular final and efficient variety of capitalism 
which was already prevailing in the United States and the United Kingdom. The co-evolution approach 
had no simple prescription and was rather warning about the dangers of hybridising economic systems 
which had co-evolved complementary institutions.  
In the co-evolution framework, American populism (keep capitalistic dynasties under control!) and 
European social democracy (create workers' counter-power to powerful capitalist families!)  were 
interpreted as two very different political strategies sharing a common purpose: both made the 
concentration of power associated with large-scale production compatible with democracy and 
safeguarded the human capital investment of non-owners.    
In terms of a narrower concept of economic efficiency, each form of business organization 
requires many complementary institutions. For this reason, disequilibrium situations, such as those 
encountered by Britain in its transition from one politics-business co-evolution path to another, are 
likely to be particularly painful. Once a particular set of business institutions has been established, a 
country may often find a path to the accumulation of human and material capital that is better suited to 
those institutions. The complementarities among political power relations, business institutions and 
economic resources may make changes very difficult to accomplish, even when they are in the direction 
of more promising development paths. Moreover, in a globally integrated economic environment, each 
country may specialize in those sectors where it enjoys a comparative institutional advantage and 
extend the economic role of its specific institutions (Pagano, 2007; Belloc and Bowles, 2009; Costinot, 
2009; Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). Such productive and institutional specialization may make 
change even more difficult. 
 Only if the potential complementarities are taken into account, some combination of coherent 
policies may be beneficial. By contrast, one-sided measures, which import only one characteristic of a 




towards a fitness valley of inconsistent attributes. And they may even upset the country-specific balance 
between economic power and political democracy.  
Part of the crisis can indeed be blamed on the hybridization of different systems. To mention few 
examples German banks invested in risky securities of foreign and severed their symbiotic relations 
with local firms and their employees. The Glass Steagall act, which marked an important systemic 
difference between the marked based dispersed American system and German universal banking, was 
repealed. Most regulations, which guaranteed the workings and the competitiveness of American 
financial markets, were dismantled while the institutions, such as the German codetermination system, 
which balanced the concentrated employers power were weakened. 
In the present crisis, the pre-hybridization recent past arrangements are likely to be powerful 
attractors and may offer the key for understanding possible scenarios and their policy implications.  
There are however many obvious limitations for reading future event through the lenses of the past. In 
the first place, at least one country, England, has a non-remote past different from its recent 
arrangements (only in the simplifications of many theories, this recent history made her a permanent 
member of the so-called “Anglo-Saxon model”). In this case, the power past attractor is particularly 
doubtful. Secondly, the crisis is genuinely a global one where international arrangements have played 
an important role
16 and limit the diversification of countries according to their past attractors. For this 
reason, many institutional arrangements must be negotiated at international level. Finally, in spite of the 
perseverance through many decades of national politics-business interaction paths, history is never 
repeating itself. The future is also a product of our (mis)conceptions. Each paper (including the present 




In this appendix we briefly review the econometric approach adopted (for a more detailed textbook 
treatment see, for instance, Koop, 2003, on which we draw in our exposition below). Assume we have a 
matrix of data Y = [y, x] and a vector of parameters θ = [ ,... ,.. , 2 1 k θ θ θ ] and want to learn about the 
parameters θ  given the data Y. We can apply Bayes’ theorem, which states that: 
) (








= .                                                        (A1) 
) (Y p  is the marginal density of the observations included in Y. ) (θ p  is the prior density: it summarizes 
our beliefs about θ  before analysing the data, Y, and is subjectively determined by the researcher. 
) | ( θ Y p  is the likelihood function which gives the joint data density value conditionally to the 
                                                 
16 Global rights such as IPR set limits to this diversity. They set also limits to the quantities and to the typologies of 




maximum-likelihood estimate of θ . Finally, the posterior density,  ) | ( Y p θ , combines the latter two 
pieces of information and expresses our knowledge about θ  after looking at the data. The mean of the 
posterior density may be utilized as a point estimate, that is 
, ) | ( ) | ( θ θ θ θ d Y p Y E k k ∫ =                                                         (A2) 
and the posterior standard deviation may be interpreted as a measure of the degree of uncertainty of the 
point estimate, that is 
. ) | ( ) | ( where
)] | ( [ ) | ( . .
2 2
2 2
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
d Y p Y E





                                                (A3) 
Except special cases, (A2) does not present an analytical derivation. We must consequently resort to 
sampling algorithms (such as the Gibbs sampling and the Metropolist-Hastings algorithm). 
A.2 Model comparison 
Bayesian model comparison is performed by using the posterior odds ratios. Suppose that there exist n 
plausible theories to explain data Y = [y, x], and that each of them can be summarized by a statistical 
model Mi with i = 1,2…n, which depends on parameters  i θ . The posterior density, the prior density and 
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=                                            (A4) 
We are interested in determining which model is more likely to be (preferred in terms of likelihood 
maximization) given the data Y. By Bayes’ theorem, we can also write:  
) ( ) | ( ) ( ) | (
) ( ) | (
) | (
j j i i
i i
i M p M Y p M p M Y p




=  (A5) 
where i ≠ j, and  i i i i i i d M p M Y p M Y p θ θ θ ∫ = ) | ( ) , | ( ) | (  is called marginal probability of the data given 
Mi. Expression (A5) defines the posterior probability that Mi is correct (under the assumption that either 
Mi or Mj is correct, i.e.  ) | ( Y M p i +) | ( Y M p j = 1). An expression analogous to (A5) can be derived 




















PO = =                                                (A6) 
which states the extent to which the data support Mi relatively to model Mj. The first fraction on the 




ratio. In the absence of prior beliefs supporting one model against the other, the prior odds ratio is equal 






ij ij M Y p
M Y p
B PO = =                                                           (A7) 
If Bij is larger than unity, we can say that model i is more likely than model j in explaining Y. If, on the 
contrary, Bij is smaller than unity, model Mj is suggested to be more likely than Mi.  
A.3 Diagnostic tests 
Following Geweke (1992), we compute numerical standard errors ( E S ˆ N ) for the approximations of the 
point estimates,  ) | ( Y E k θ . The  E S ˆ N  is given by  S g / ˆ σ , where  g σ ˆ  is the estimated standard error of 
the importance function,  ) (θ g , conditional to Y, and S is the number of replications of the Gibbs 
sampler  (for more details see Geweke, 1992, and Koop, 2003). A second diagnostic test suggested by 
Geweke (1992) is the convergence diagnostic (CD). This compares the estimated  ) | ( Y E k θ  based on 
the first SA replications (after the burn-in replications) and that based on the last SB replications. If the 
two estimates turn out to be significantly different, this means that not enough replications have been 
used by the sampler. The relevant statistics is given by  ) ( ) (
B A B A S S S S E S ˆ N E S ˆ N / g ˆ g ˆ + − , where 
A S g ˆ and
B S g ˆ are the estimates of () Y E k | θ  based on respectively the first SA and the last SB replications, 
and 
A S E S ˆ N  and 
B S E S ˆ N  are the corresponding computed numerical standard errors. The CD statistics is 
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Appendix B: Estimated prior and posterior densities - Prior3 
(Dashed lines denote priors, solid lines denote posteriors) 
 
 







                     










           









                      










           








                      












            
 
Fig B.2: Estimated prior and posterior densities for β2
Fig B.3: Estimated prior and posterior densities for β3 Fig B.4: Estimated prior and posterior densities for β4
Fig B.5: Estimated prior and posterior densities for β5 Fig B.6: Estimated prior and posterior densities for β6














                        











           











                      










          










                       









Fig B.7: Estimated prior and posterior densities for β7 Fig B.8: Estimated prior and posterior densities for β8
Fig B.9: Estimated prior and posterior densities for β9 Fig B.10: Estimated prior and posterior densities for β10
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